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1. Introduction
Capital formation has been identified in Development 
theories as a determining factor for economic transforma-
tion of developing countries, just as aid has been identi-
fied as a major source of capital formation for economic 
growth and development [1]. Historically, aid or what is 
called Official Development Assistance (ODA) could 
be traced back to the United Nations Charter of the con-
ference of San Francisco on June 26th 1945. The motive 
behind ODA (foreign aid) has been to remove poverty on 
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the face of the earth, raise savings and investment, raise 
growth, and raise living standard in developing countries. 
Aid comes to developing countries through two ways: 
multilateral and bilateral aid.
Bilateral aid can be explained as ODA undertaken 
directly with a developing country by a donor country 
[2]. It includes transactions with Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) which are active in developmental 
programmes as well as other transactions related to 
internal development like administrative costs, debt relief 
and spending on development awareness. It has been 
accepted by experts that bilateral ODA is given on the 
basis of political motives of the donor country rather than 
on the reforms for institutional quality in the aid-receiving 
country for its own sake [3]. 
Multilateral aid, on the other hand, involves an interna-
tional agenc(y)ies lending helping hands in any or some 
developmental projects in recipient countries. Multilateral 
aid is usually given by multilateral agencies or organiza-
tions. A multilateral organization is an international orga-
nization made up of member nations/governments, with 
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Figure 1. Net ODA received and GDP growth rate in 
Nigeria 1961 - 2019
Source: Computed by authors from WDI database (2020)
From Figure 1, the net official development assistance 
has been somewhat plummeting over the years until about 
2005 when Nigeria was the second largest recipients of 
ODA, and ranked among the tenth highest recipients in 
Africa, between the periods of 2009 to 2011 [4]. Total net 
bilateral development aid in these same periods stood 
at US$1657 million, US$2062 million, and US$1813 
million respectively. The level of the ODA was very high 
but declined at about 2008 following the global financial 
crisis. After this high level, it grew again but gently and 
continues to grow even as in 2020.
However, the annual growth rate of the economy 
(shown in Figure 2) has much fluctuations and never 
showed a steady-state growth. It could be asserted that the 
aid had not shown much significant impact on growth rate 
of Nigerian economy, as it did not show any significant 
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Figure 2. Annual GDP growth rate in Nigeria 1961 - 2019
Source: Computed by authors from WDI database (2020)
There is an argument on the premise that the quality 
of institution is essential in providing an enabling envi-
ronment for economic prosperity to the poorer propor-
tion of populations in Nigeria. Studies such as [5-7] have 
emphasized on the need for strong institutional quality to 
guarantee sustainable growth and development. The basic 
impediments to Africa and Latin America economic prog-
ress is in the uncertainty and manipulation white spaces 
in the judicial system, corruption, bribery, tax evasion, 
ill-defined property rights and the existence of inefficient 
institutions as ill-conceived arrangements cause those 
countries to be risky and unattractive [8-,12].
In most developing countries, institutions are mainly 
of a nature developing redistribution activities instead 
of production activities, creating monopolies instead of 
competitive conditions, restricting opportunities instead 
of developing them, these institutions rarely lead to 
investments that will increase productivity [13]. In addition, 
wealth accumulation in Africa is likely to be affected by 
institutional characteristics such as the distribution of 
political and civil rights, the quality of the legal system 
and government effectiveness [14]. [15] alluded that African 
countries lose $90 billion annually through illicit financial 
flow to overseas with bulk of it coming from Nigeria and 
institutional weakness is one of the major reasons for this 
setback.
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Several studies have shown that revenues from the 
exploitation of natural resources could hamper growth 
mainly by weakening institutions [16]. This phenomenon, 
which is better known as the “curse of natural resources” 
partly relies on the arguments explaining that these 
additional and unexpected resources provide disincentives 
for governments to undertake institutional reforms, and 
are a source of rent-seeking behaviors. Some studies have 
concluded that foreign aid may also represent a resource 
curse. Foreign aid transfers have been considered as 
windfalls in several other studies, and thus as a source 
of rent-seeking. [17] interestingly point out that aid and 
natural resources share a common feature inasmuch 
as they can both be captured by rent-seeking leaders. 
Similarly, researchers [18] also stress that aid and resource 
rents share the general character of “windfall gains” that 
disrupt political and economic incentives although some 
important differences can be noted between them. [19] also 
explain that aid transfers and natural resources both have 
the character of windfalls since poor countries can benefit 
from them without much effort and both have the ability 
to generate rent-seeking.
We should note that government accountability is about 
the obligations of a government to insure good-quality 
institutions in return for taxation resources obtained from 
citizens. The rationale of the arguments explaining the 
impacts of aid on institutions related on this accountability 
is based upon the relationship at the equilibrium between 
the supply of tax revenues and the demand for quality 
institutions by taxpayers. The expectation is that as long 
as citizens remain subject to taxes, they are entitled to 
claim back the effective use of these funds, which are 
guaranteed by quality institutions. The interesting point to 
consider here is that aid potentially breaks this equilibrium 
since it provides the government with funds from outside 
the country, the consequence being that governments 
become less accountable to citizens as regards institutional 
strengthening. Therefore, taxes stemming from citizens 
are no longer accompanied by the same demand for 
quality institutions, insofar as the state’s financing demand 
is reduced by the greater availability of external resources 
(aid).
Evidence from available literature indicates that 
although a few studies have assessed the influence of 
quality institutions in underdeveloped countries, even 
fewer researches have been undertaken on country-
specific study of impact of quality of institutions on 
multilateral aid. The goal of this study is to investigate 
the impact of institutional quality on multilateral aid in 
Nigeria.
2. Review of Relevant Literature 
The second-best theory of institutional quality 
states that in the face of limiting factors that inhibit the 
achievement of the optimal, attaining a greater level of 
optimization circumstances is not assured to be superior 
to a situation in which fewer requirements are satisfied. 
[20] are the ones that initially formalized the theory leading 
to its adoption in many works. According to them, should 
a variable which impedes the accomplishment of one of 
the Paretian conditions enters into a general equilibrium 
system the varying Paretian conditions, although still 
attainable (second best optimum situation), are no longer 
desirable. However, the optimal state if eventually 
achieved may be labeled a second-best optimum given 
that it is accomplished subject to a limitation which, by 
description, inhibits the fulfillment of a Paretian optimal.
Another theory is the big push theory which advocates 
a comprehensive lump-sum of investment package 
which will push a nation to economic development, on 
the condition that a given minimum amount of resources 
must be devoted for developmental programs, and on a 
condition that the program must be successful. [21] was the 
first to propose the theory while [22] later contributed to 
its development. Rosenstein stressed that less developed 
countries need large amounts of investments to attain 
economic development from their current condition of 
backwardness. [23] argued that foreign aid has likened to the 
big push policy used in the post-World War reconstruction of 
Europe as it supplied international capital, while [24] argued 
that unless there are reformed institutions and policies, the 
big push would not be achieved using foreign aid.
Multilateral agencies, in order to prevent political 
capture, are presumed to possess some degrees of 
freedom from states’ control [25]. Extant literature shows 
evidently bilateral channels as, clearly, more amenable 
to political capture when compared to multilateral 
channels, with adverse consequences for development. 
Experts have supported the claim of bilateral donors’ 
interests directly skewed such that allocation of aid favors 
strategic behavior and political motives, as compared to 
country’s need or potential for development impact [26,27]. 
Another economist [28] asserts that political motive of the 
donors usually slows chances for growth of economy in 
comparison with aid through multilateral channels. 
Africa has presented a peculiar scenario in terms of aid 
and political patronage of aid donors. Researchers like 
[29-32] have argued that political patronage has become a 
regular feature of political trend in Africa. The concept 
of patronage politics is used to describe a system where 
rulers buy their position and remain in power by supplying 
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steady streams of ‘rental’ returns to maintain respect 
and supports and be able to influence their anticipated 
opponents. Many countries in Africa have been affected 
by and mismanagement of this ‘patronage’ system has 
led to untold and unpleasant results: in most countries in 
Africa, more than half of the incumbent heads of state 
from their political autonomy to 1991 were imprisoned, 
executed, assassinated, or forced into exile. 
A large number of studies have argued that aid feeds 
directly into this patronage system [33-36]. This is obvious 
since donor agencies or countries do not and are often 
unwilling to completely monitor aid [37-40], hence autocrats 
usually capitalize on this and bolster their regime through 
it [41-44]. The size of amount of ODA used to sponsor 
patronage systems usually leads autocrats to change some 
foreign policies in favour of the specific goal to meet [45].
Applying panel data of developing countries, [46] 
retrieved from [47], revealed a direct linkage between 
institutional performance and foreign aid in developing 
economies (also supported by [48-51]. [52] used simultaneous 
equation model and Generalized Method Moments 
(GMM) in their study of the effect of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), foreign aid and government on 
sustainable development. The study showed that aid 
supports human capital and sustainable development, 
while FDI plays more or less negative role due to resource 
outflow. [53] studied several determinants of bureaucratic 
quality and their effects were estimated applying the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data. Their 
finding shows that the bureaucratic services quality is 
inversely related when the proportion of a country’s 
foreign aid rises relative to Gross National Product (GNP). 
The differential effect of aid can be dependent upon 
the destination country’s characteristics or institutional 
quality such as the composition of public expenditure, 
corruption, and inequality among others. Furthermore, the 
argument has been that development aid to less developed 
nations does not often reach the actual people due to poor 
institutional quality of developing nations [54].
However, some other researchers assert that foreign 
aid has played catalytic roles in democratic reforms. The 
demise of the Cold War made multilateral and bilateral 
donors become more emphatic on applying stringent 
conditions for aid, and donor interests became more 
explicitly political. There are two factors that helped 
donors to increasingly enforce political conditions on aid 
in the 1990s [55]. The first case is that donors observed that 
only changes in macroeconomic policies cannot remove 
structural barriers to economic growth and development, 
as could exemplified in economically inefficient 
regulations and opaque implementation of the rule of 
law. Using the new concept of “good governance”, donor 
agencies designed aid clauses that demanded institutional 
changes (reforms) from governments in return for funds 
[56-58,42].
Second, when the Soviet Union collapsed, recipient 
countries had less ability to maneuver the conditions; 
it was difficult for them to evade donor conditions, and 
had to lose great power to bargain with respect to donors 
[29,45,58-60]. Many researchers have observed that resources 
from aid are not uniform and vary across countries, 
regions and continents. Aids have numerous objectives 
and modalities; some fit into the theories posited in the 
literature [61-63]. As noted by [64,65], donors’ amounts given 
to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and/or to a 
project director directly, as example, are most likely to 
achieve intended targets as opposed to assistance made 
through budget directly to a government ministry because 
the latter may be spent like every other item in the budget. 
Using GMM techniques for 78 countries using panel 
data econometrics for the period of 1984-2004 [66], 
analyzed the link between aid volatility and per capita 
economic growth with particular emphasis on institutional 
performance. They found that performance of ODA and 
per capita economic growth was dependent on quality of 
institutions and a negative linkage between volatility of 
aid and economic growth of a country. They concluded 
that aid effectiveness is better in a country with strong 
institutions. Similar views by [67,68], stated that effectiveness 
of aid is better achieved in an environment where the 
quality of institution is high. Despite the enormous funds 
dispatched to developing countries by international 
agencies, results have not been achieved in recipient 
countries, and this creates doubts whether foreign aid is 
effective for transforming African economies [50]. 
[69] examined whether grants sway growth as countries 
implement good economic policies. The study revealed 
that good policies help nation to achieve the targets of 
aid. The finding is in accordance with [51] assertion that 
good policies and proper management of economy are as 
important if not of greater importance as foreign aid for 
developing countries. Some studies have laid credence 
to the theoretical underpinning that many nations have 
been fungible in their usage of funds through swapping 
funds from the aid sectors where they are meant to non-
earmarked sectors [70-72]. [73] investigated the best approach 
to introduce in making financial aid effective for Ghana 
and suggested that there should be good planning between 
the government and donor partners to ensure the multi-
donor budgetary support (MDBS) is successful.
The problem of aid effectiveness, according to [74], is 
that donor funds flow to economies whose policies hamper 
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growth and impoverish the citizens. [75], also asserted 
that leaders of these governments create incentives to 
make institutions of low quality which create avenues for 
crises to engender more inflows of aid. [76] asserted that 
economies with feeble institutional framework have poor 
economic growth which leads to difficulties in dealing 
with political and economic shocks and crisis. In the past 
decades, funding nations and multinational agencies (e.g. 
the World Bank), have donated whooping sum of over 
$1 trillion USD yearly as ODA to enhance economic 
development in Africa alone [77]; in spite of this monetary 
assistance, many of these countries have not improved 
their economic conditions. According to [78], enhancement 
of institutions is very important to reduce disparity 
for the reason that better, more democratic institutions 
assist governments to ensure the basic necessities of life 
of the poor. This is to say that quality institutions and 
governance effectively reduce poverty and inequality by 
redistributing income via progressive tax system and by 
reducing the sway of the political office holders through 
clampdowns on corruptive tendencies. When these strong 
institutions are absent, aid efforts have to be devoted to 
raising institutional quality and good governance prior 
to effectively dedicating them to plans for economic 
development. As good macroeconomic policies, including 
GDP per capita and income inequality, are considered 
important for aid allocations, aid would have the ability to 
reduce poverty [79].
[80] revealed that aid to African economies reduces 
poverty in addition to raising economic growth. Their 
study empirically evaluated time series data between 
1968 and 1999, and concluded that the policy regimes 
concerning trade and inflation could influence the size of 
aid received. Institutional political factors including the 
state of democracy, or regime type have frequently been 
investigated as they relate with foreign aid effectiveness. 
According to [81], foreign aid is not effective under elitist 
regimes, but is effective under totalitarian regimes. 
Researchers have itemized three varieties of regimes, 
namely, egalitarian, elitist, and laissez-faire were 
investigated on how they would utilize foreign aid [82]. The 
outcome showed that elitist regime would ensure only the 
welfare of the ruling coalition by transferring these funds 
to few high-income political elites. An egalitarian regime 
tries to maximize the welfare of a fixed group of citizens 
with relatively low endowments and tends to ameliorate 
poverty indicators, while the laissez-faire regime usually 
maximizes the welfare of a minimum and substantial 
proportion of the population and utilizes aid to lower 
distortionary taxes.
Adding to the measurement issues, the mixed findings 
(on the link between aids and democracy) may have to 
do with the condition that some autocrats face riskier 
elections than others. For example, as there is a higher 
probability that an autocrat will surrender power, or 
coerced into better redistribution of government resources 
more equitably through elections, there is a little chance 
that donors will be able to promote liberalization. It has 
been asserted explicitly by [83] that aid can only affect 
democratic regime when the risk of an incumbent losing 
office is low. He further explains that when this risk is 
low—using measures of a winning coalition size and 
economic growth—foreign aid has a direct effect upon 
democratic governance. Specifically, recent theories 
suggest that citizens of aid origin are moved by some 
moral thinking and clearly assume that altruistic motives 
are behind people’s support for aid to poor countries and 
disapprove of giving aid to unsavory regimes. 
Aid inflows increase government spending, in many 
cases, a phenomenon which economists describe with the 
concept of flypaper effect, meaning that funds from grants 
and aids induce public expenditures, while revenues 
coming from taxes lead to less public expenditures [84]. 
[85] found out that aid raises the government size and 
government outlays and hampers the urge to drive taxes 
for more revenues. This result contravenes market‐
oriented plans which many donor nations would like the 
poor countries to adopt. He further concluded that aid 
induces corruption, because it thwarts incentive drives 
of politicians to follow good policies. [86] asserted that 
the aid recipient countries receive the funds as ‘transfers’ 
they do not spend it well and these governments do 
not work hard to alleviate suffering or poverty because 
they believe that more aid will flow in. When aids are 
handed over to corrupt governments and also kleptocratic 
elites, “corruption-poverty spirals” become common, 
deterring economic growth [87]. According to [88], recipients 
of large funds from aid strategically reduce quality of 
institutions and administrative capacity, and thus create 
an environment for rent-seeking behavior and creating 
what he called “Zairean disease”. When countries depend 
more on aid than any other source of funds, infighting 
and struggles to control resources among political class 
over huge flow of resources from aid is intensified and 
corruption levels heightened.
Given all these facts, literature on the influence 
of corruption and other institutional quality on aid 
effectiveness have been rife with mixed results. Therefore, 
we do not have clear consensus on the linkage between 
institutional quality indicators and aid. Most researches 
reviewed focused on cross-country assessment and little or 
no country-specific study has been undertaken. Therefore, 
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it becomes imperative to investigate the influence of 
foreign aid on institutional quality in Nigeria, especially 
as she has accumulated so much from aid and yet has been 
branded the “headquarter of poverty” in the world.
3. Methodology and Data
Theoretical Framework
The RN-DI (recipient-need and donor-interest) model 
by [89] is the framework for this study. The RN-DI model 
suggests that agencies which give aid have underlying 
factors which affect their aid allocation decisions. Donor 
nations’ interest is focused either on donors’ interests 
or recipients’ needs. While donor-interest model is 
assumed to fit bilateral aid, while the latter model explains 
multilateral flow [90]. The combination of the DI and RN 
perspectives is used to study varying factors influencing 
foreign aid, including humanitarian concerns, foreign 
relations (political interest), and economic interests. 
It is inadequate as another dimension (namely, policy 
performance variable) has been added to the study of the 
determinants of multilateral aid flow. Hence, while donor-
interest illustrates the economic, strategic, and political 
interests of the donor; recipient-need explains the social, 
economic, and human development needs of the aid-
receiving countries, and policy performance explains the 
economic fundamentals of the recipient nation [91]. 
Therefore, in the current study, we will pay greater 
attention to policy performance variables. The model is 
estimated using longitudinal data for Nigeria between 
1980 and 2016. The variables used were gotten from the 
Quality of Governance database and World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank. The methodology applied 
was Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bound 
cointegrated model propounded by [92-94]. This econometric 
method is free from imposition of the restrictive 
assumption that the variables in the model must have 
the same order of integration, unlike other approaches, 
and is robust in small samples. The ARDL model yields 
consistent long-run coefficients which are asymptotically 
normally distributed irrespective of whether the 
independent variables are I(1) or I(0) [94]. [95] shows that 
this model produces long-run unbiased estimates and 
reliable t-statistics even if some variables are endogenous. 
Further, bound test approach appears more appealing 
than rival tests in the small sample size cases with many 
parameters.
Model Specifications
Based on the theoretical explanations above, we specify 
the model as for the study as follows:
LOG_ODA= F (LOG_GDPPC, LOG_POP,  
Ind_judi, free_speech, free_express)   (1)
Econometrically, it becomes
0 1 2 3 4 5_ _ _ exp ...........2tODA GDPpc POP ind judi free speech free ressβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +
0 1 2 3 4 5_ _ _ exp ...........2tODA GDPpc POP ind judi free speech free ressβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +   (2)
The variables are defined as: ODA = multilateral aid 
as sourced from Development Indicators published by the 
World Bank’s 
GDPPC = per-capita GDP
POP = population 
Ind_judi = independence of the judiciary, a binary 
variable indicating if the judiciary is independence or not. 
This variable is obtained from the quality of governance 
database. 
Free_speech = index of freedom of speech obtained 
from the quality of government database
Free_assoc =index of freedom of expression also 
extracted from the quality of governance 
Where the coefficients β0 and β1, β2 β3 β4 β5 are 
the parameters that characterize the equation and their 
specification is the objective of the regression exercise.
The model will be estimated using the ARDL form as 
presented in Equation 3.
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4. Results and Discussion 
Unit Root Tests









LOG_ODA -1.943012 -2.525195 I(0)
LOG_GDPpc -3.447072 -4.948135 I(1)
LOG_POP -1.943364 -20.8175 I(0)
Ind_judi -1.943449 -2.298222 I(0)
Free_speech -2.885249 -7.011193 I(1)
Free_Assoc -1.943449 -2.167206 I(0)
Source: Authors computation with Eviews 9
The results of the stationarity test for the series used at 
42
Journal of Economic Science Research | Volume 04 | Issue 04 | October 2021
both levels and in first difference are presented in Table 
1. The Philip-Peron staionarity test was also applied and 
the result indicates that all the variables were stationary at 
level except GDPPC and freedom of association as their 
absolute value of Philip Peron test statistic for GDPPC 
and Freedom of association exceeded the critical value 
only with one difference. No variable is I(2), hence, we 
adopted the ARDL bound test approach to check for long 
run relationship in the model. 
ARDL Bound Test Results
The ARDL Bound test’s critical value is dependent on 
selected lag length. In this case, the optimal lag (p) was 
determined empirically based on Hannan Quinn Criterion 
(HQC). [96]’s critical values are adopted. 
Table 2. the ARDL bound test for the model
Test Statistic Value K
F-statistic  3.642357 5
Critical Value Bounds





Source: Authors computation using Eviews 9.0
Table 2 shows the bound test’s F-statistics of 14.48909 
is greater than the critical upper bound value (3.79) 
at 5% significant level. This clearly shows a long-run 
relationship among the variables. 
Empirical Results 
Based on the ARDL results as presented in Table 3, 
long-run linkage between multilateral aid and institutional 
performance variables in Nigeria are not statistically 
significant. This means that major institutional quality 
variables in Nigeria do not significantly affect the level of 
multilateral aid coming into Nigeria except independence 
of the judiciary which negatively and significantly affects 
multilateral aid in Nigeria against a priori expectations. 
The results show that, apart from independence of the 
judiciary, that is statistically significant at 5 percent level 
of significance, other institutional quality variables do not 
influence multilateral aid in Nigeria significantly. Hence, 
unit improvement in the independence of judiciary index 
in Nigeria, decreases multilateral aid by about 15%, 
holding all other factors constant, implying that judiciary 
is not free to act on its own and enforce law of contracts. 
From expectations, institutional quality variables are 
major determinants of multilateral aid as can be seen by 
the policy performance variables argument in the RN-DI 
model applied by [91]. These institutional variables which 
serve as watch-dogs to donor agencies ought to be the 
major factors in the determination of aids to economies. 
The study objective is to investigate the impact of 
institutional quality on multilateral aid in Nigeria and 
from the results obtained, it can be affirmed that most 
institutional quality variables apart from independence 
of the judiciary do not significantly affect multilateral 
aid in Nigeria. This result is quite contrary to economic 
expectation and even contrary to the empirical arguments 
of the RN-DI model as exemplified by the findings of [90]. 
Table 3. Estimated Long-run Coefficients Based on ARDL (3, 2, 0, 1, 0, 2)
Dependent variable
(ODA)
Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic P-value
GDPPC 1616856.67876 32345474.411033* 0.689352 0.4921
POP 68383374.731743 42260513.202294* 1.618139 0.1087
Ind_judi 429716717.491084 557644526.209210* 0.770593 0.4427
Free_speech 914891612.172300 505703705.822906* 1.809146 0.0733
Free_assoc -647040599.800278 434085031.927801* -1.490585 0.1391
C -8712618228.654552 3347047699.857476* -2.603076 0.0106
R2 =0.540220 Adjusted R2 = 0.482747
S.E of regression = 5.60E+08 F-statistics = 9.399617
Prob (F-statistics) = 0.0000    Durbin Watson (DW) = 2.084650
(*) denotes Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation (HAC) consistent standard errors
** Denote significant at 5% level; 
Source: Authors computation using Eviews 9.0
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However, the result is a further proof that multilateral 
aids to Nigeria are based on other factors that are non-
economic in nature. These factors could be more political 
than rational, and may explain why Nigeria still received 
huge sums of foreign aid even during the ruthless military 
regimes. 
The coefficient of multiple determination (R2)) 
measures the goodness of fit of the fitted regression line 
to a set of data. From the model result, the R2 value of 
0.56720 shows that about 57 percent of the variations 
in the dependent variable (ODA) are explained by 
variations in the model independent variables. This is 
reasonably adequate as it is above 50 percent. In similar 
manner, the F statistics of 9.399617 and its probability of 
0.000000 shows that the independent variables are jointly 
statistically significant and therefore reliable even though 
they are individually insignificant; the Durbin Watson’s 
value of 2.084650 shows the regression is not spurious.
The next step is to analyze the short-run dynamic 
impact of institutional quality on multilateral aid. Short-
run dynamics of the equilibrium relationship were 
obtained through the error correction model and the 
results are presented in Table 4. The error correction term 
measures the speed at which the dependent (endogenous) 
variable adjusts to change in the explanatory variables 
before converging to its equilibrium level.








D(ODA(-1)) 0.536188 0.073156 7.329394 0.0000
D(ODA(-2)) 0.118721 0.044010 2.697556 0.0082
D(GDPPC) 0.000071 0.000026 2.710830 0.0079
D(GDPPC(-1)) -0.000043 0.000024 -1.793504 0.0758
D(POP) -0.752351 0.490258 -1.534603 0.1279
D(Ind_judi) 0.827361 0.451685 1.831720 0.0699
D(free_speech 0.053496 0.020035 2.670070 0.0088
D(free_speech(-1)) 3.806772 1.441800 2.640291 0.0096
D(free_assoc) 0.012270 0.006407 1.915039 0.0583
CointEq(-1) -2.534299 1.052750 -2.407314 0.0178
Source: Authors computation using Eviews 9.0
Table 4 reports the results of short dynamics of 
institutional quality and multilateral aid relationship. 
The negative and statistically significant estimate of 
CointEq(-1) validates the established long-run relationship 
among the variables. The findings also indicate that the 
estimate of CointEq(-1) is -0.820480 and is statistically 
significant at 5 percent level. This implies that about 25 
percent of the deviations from long run equilibrium are 
corrected in the next quarter period. 
The results of the short-run analysis also indicate that 
most of the variables are statistically significant even 
though they were insignificant in the long-run. This 
indicates that institutional quality significantly affects 
multilateral aid in Nigeria only for the short-run period 
even though they do not have long-run statistically 
significant effect on multilateral aid.
Table 5. Diagnostic Tests
Test F-statistic Prob. Value
Serialχ 0.700571 0.4987
Archχ 3.324792 0.0003
Ramseyχ  3.154448  0.0021
Source: Authors computation using Eviews 9.0
The post estimation (diagnostic) tests on the Table 5 
also indicate that no problem of serial correlations was 
identified, as the null hypothesis of serial correlation is 
rejected. There is also no misspecification error. However, 
there is a problem of heteroskedasticity in the model 
which was corrected by presenting Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation (HAC) consistent standard errors. Also, 
the CUSUM figure presented on Figure 1 below explains 








84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
CUSUM 5% Significance
Figure 3. CUSUM test result
5. Conclusions
From the results presented above, it has been observed 
that there exists a long-run relationship between 
multilateral aid and institutional variables in Nigeria. It 
could also be observed that the institutional variables 
do not statistically influence the multilateral aid for 
the long-run period as the variables are not statistically 
significant at 5% level of significance. However, only 
independence of judiciary has a significant influence at 
44
Journal of Economic Science Research | Volume 04 | Issue 04 | October 2021
5% level of significance. Also, from the results presented, 
the short-run results show that the institutional variables 
significantly influence multilateral aid in Nigeria. The 
results also indicated no evidence of serial correlation, 
misspecification error; but showed that the problem 
of heteroskedasticity exists in the model, but were 
corrected with Newey-West’s Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation (HAC) consistent standard errors. The 
implication of the findings is that the institutional quality 
variables do not affect multilateral aid in Nigeria, as 
assumed a priori. This means that the RN-DI model 
applied by [89] does not hold for Nigeria implying that 
there could be other factors affecting multilateral aid. 
It is therefore recommended donor agencies should 
consider other factors that may be at work against official 
development assistance (ODA) such as politics, location 
and colonial history.
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